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ADMINISTRATIVE ARBITRARINESS-
A POSTSCRIPT
KENNETH Cumr DAVIS
Although my last statement was intended to be "A Final Word,"
Mr. Berger's latest pronouncement convinces me that I should say
more. His three presentations are unsound both in all fundamentals
and in many details, and I now think that I should demonstrate that
this is so.
Mr. Berger is asserting that all administrative discretion is
judicially reviewable under section 10 of the Administrative Procedure
Act.1  I am asserting that some is and some is not. Our debate is
about what the law is, not what it ought to be.
I shall discuss (1) the statutory words, (2) the legislative
history, (3) the case law, (4) the constitutional principles, (5) the
practical needs, and (6) other ways to correct arbitrary discretion.
The Statutory Words
In his latest statement, Mr. Berger denies categorically that the
statutory words are unclear.2 I can hardly believe my eyes, because I
had supposed that no reasonable person could find the words clear.
The introductory clause of section 10 says in part: "Except so
far as . . . agency action is by law committed to agency discretion
... )) 3 1 think these words are clear, and I have pointed out that the
courts have consistently given them what I consider to be a literal
interpretation.
When the words of the introductory clause are combined with
some of the words of subsection (e), the provision reads as follows:
"Except so far as . . . agency action is by law committed to agency
discretion . . . the reviewing court shall . . . set aside agency
3 Mr. Berger says that a sound exercise of discretion continues to be insulated
from review, but he wants review of abuse of discretion. Berger, Administrative
Arbitrariness-A Rejoinder to Professor Davis' Final Word, 114 U. PA. L. Rnv. 816
(1966) [hereinafter cited as Berger, Rejoinder]. As a matter of language, it seems
to me unsound to say that discretion is not reviewable but that abuse of discretion is.
When a court reviews to determine whether or not discretion has been abused and
finds that it has not been, I think it has reviewed the discretion. My form of state-
ment is the one that the courts almost always use, although a few opinions use Mr.
Berger's form. He condemns my form of statement as "slipshod," but I prefer the
form the courts almost always use.
2 Berger, Rejoinder 816-17.
3 Administrative Procedure Act § 10, 60 Stat 243 (1946), 5 U.S.C. § 1009 (1964).
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action . . . found to be . . . an abuse of discretion." 4 These are
the words involved when Mr. Berger says in his latest statement:
"Nor do I concede that the words of section 10 are 'unclear.' "' The
reader will, I hope, look at the words to see if they provide a clear
answer to the question whether agency action committed to agency
discretion may be set aside for abuse of discretion. Is the provision
clear or unclear?
My answer is that the words of the "except" clause are clear,
and that the words of subsection (e) are clear, but that when the
two are put together the meaning is extremely unclear, because the
two oppose each other. The literal language says that the reviewing
court may set aside an abuse of discretion except so far as the agency
may exercise discretion; the exception consumes the whole power of
the court, so that whenever the agency has discretion the court is
prohibited from setting aside an abuse of discretion. But following
the literal language could not possibly be what Congress intended, for
the result would be to foreclose all review of all discretion, and all the
history shows that that was not the purpose.
In denying that the words are unclear, Mr. Berger does not read
them literally. After all, he finds that "the 'discretion' exception does
not bar review of 'abuse of discretion,' " ' a conclusion not warranted
by a literal reading of the words, as Mr. Berger himself asserts.7 Near
the beginning of his Columbia Law Review article he said: "On a
literal reading the exception for 'discretion' at the outset of Section 10
may be thought to exempt 'abuse of discretion' and 'arbitrary' action
from review. But such a reading must be rejected because it produces
unreasonable consequences . . .. " 8 Can the words be clear if a
literal reading must be rejected?
Now let me point out, parenthetically, the kind of thinking Mr.
Berger uses in attacking me. He quotes me for the proposition that
the courts unanimously read the "except" clause literally. He says
this is "utterly misleading . . . as I shall prove by the Professor's
own words." ' Then, without saying that he is moving from a dis-
cussion of the "except" clause to a discussion of a combination of the
"'ex~cept" clause and a part of subsection (e), he quotes me as saying
that the literal language makes neither grammatical nor practical
4 Ibid.
5 Berger, Rejoinder 817.
6 Berger, Administrative Arbitrariness and Judicial Review, 65 COLUm. L. REv.
55, 63 (1965) [hereinafter cited as Berger, Administrative Arbitrariness].
7 Berger, Administrative Arbitrariness 58.
SIbid.
9 Berger, Administrative Arbitrariness-A Reply to Professor Davis, 114 U. PA.
L. REv. 783, 787 (1966) [hereinafter cited as Berger, Reply].
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sense.'0 He thus leads the reader to believe that I both favor and
oppose a literal reading of the same provision. He builds a whole
structure on this base, including such statements as: "Certainly the
law 'is' not that the 'except' clause is given the 'literal' effect that
Davis now claims for it and now rejects.":"
Now let me state how I interpret the combination of the
"except" clause with a part of subsection (e). For me the problem
has been difficult. The legislative history being conflicting and un-
helpful (as I shall show), I have sought what I have called "a practical
interpretation which will carry out the probable intent and which will
produce sound substantive results." 1 The main idea is to emphasize
the word "committed." So far as the action is by law "committed" to
agency discretion, it is not reviewable, even for arbitrariness or abuse
of discretion; it is not "committed" to agency discretion to the extent
that it is reviewable. This means that the two concepts "committed
to agency discretion" and "unreviewable" have in this limited context
the same meaning. Both depend upon the statutes and the common
law. To the extent that "the law" cuts off review for abuse of dis-
cretion, the action is committed to agency discretion. The result is
that the pre-act law on this point continues."
I do not say that the statutory words require my interpretation.
Nor do I say that the legislative history must be interpreted my way.
I do say that my interpretation is consistent with the statutory words
and with the legislative history taken as a whole, and that it is a sound
and workable interpretation. It is the best solution that I have been
able to find for a difficult problem. Rightly or wrongly, this solution
has been adopted by every court that has considered it, so far as the
reported opinions reveal.
10 Ibid.
1 Id. at 794.
12 DAvis, ADMINISTRATivE LAw TRF.XISE § 28.16, at 80 (1958) [hereinafter cited
as DAVIS, TREATISE].
13 Mr. Berger's misunderstandings are too numerous for me to try to correct
and many of them are obvious enough that I need not. One that is unsound on a
subtle basis and reaches the heart of my interpretation may well be dealt with. He
says that my analysis "deprives the courts of power to reconsider whether prior
statutory interpretations are 'good law."' He says I have "painted" myself "into a
corner," and he writes most of a page on this subject, concluding: "Under the Davis
reasoning, section 10 froze the 'pre-Act law' and put the prior interpretive statutory
denials of review beyond the reach of the courts." Berger, Reply 811.
Of course, if my analysis had any such effect, I would reject it. But the act
did not freeze any prior practice. The act can codify pre-existing law and still leave
the courts free to go on developing the codified law. Furthermore, if Mr. Berger
had read § 28.16 of my Treatise more carefully, he would have found the following
sentence: "And the courts remain free, except to the extent that other statutes are
controlling, to continue to determine on practical grounds in particular cases to what
extent action should or should not be unreviewable even for abuse of discretion."
DAvis, TREATISE § 28.16, at 80-81.
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The Legislative History
In his latest statement, Mr. Berger specifically denies that the
legislative history is conflicting.' Of all the strange Berger positions,
this is the strangest. The legislative history is all in print, and
any reader can examine it for himself and see that it points in both
directions.
My Treatise in section 28.08 reviews the legislative history, but
the focus there is on the broad question whether Congress intended
to change the law of reviewability. The conclusion is that "the
background materials of the Act show an abandonment of the early
extreme position of trying to eliminate unreviewability [Berger's
position], and the specific legislative history is conflicting and
confusing." 15
I shall now present the legislative history opposed to Mr. Berger's
position. My purpose is not to show that it leads to a conclusion
against Berger; my purpose is to show that it is conflicting.
Attorney General Robert H. Jackson, in an analysis of the
Walter-Logan bill of 1940, prepared at the President's request, said
that the bill
sweeps into the judicial hopper all manner of questions which
have never before been considered appropriate for judicial
review.
For example, such matters as the awarding of contracts,
the acceptance or rejection of supplies, the granting or with-
holding of compensation or hospitalization from a veteran
.. may become subject to judicial review were this bill
to become law, but which have never been regarded as so
reviewable. 6
This position was incorporated into the President's message vetoing the
bill. The majority of the Attorney General's Committee recom-
mended no change in availability of review. The minority of the
Committee took care to provide that statutory provisions precluding
review should remain valid and binding; this showed that even the
minority rejected the Walter-Logan view (which is essentially what
Mr. Berger advocates). The minority position was carried into
section 10 of the administrative procedure bill. The view asserted
by the document supporting the President's veto message prevailed.
14 Berger, Rejoinder 816-17.
15 DAvis, TREATISE § 28.08, at 41 (1958).
1686 CONG. REc. 13945 (1940) (report to the President from Attorney General
Robert H. Jackson accompanying veto message).
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At the time the bill was before Congress, two groups were
opposing each other, one led by Mr. Carl McFarland, Chairman of the
ABA Special Committee on Administrative Law, and the other by
Attorney General Tom C. Clark. When the two groups compromised,
both houses unanimously passed the compromise bill. Although the two
sides were at odds on most issues, on the question of reviewability the
Attorney General and Mr. McFarland agreed. The Attorney General
said that section 10 "in general, declares the existing law concerning
judicial review." 17 Mr. McFarland said: "We do not believe the
principle of review or the extent of review can or should be greatly
altered. We think that the basic exception of administrative discretion
should be preserved, must be preserved." '8
The Senate Judiciary Committee Print said of section 10: "The
introductory exceptions state the two present general or basic situations
in which judicial review is precluded-where (1) the matter is dis-
cretionary or (2) statutes withhold judicial powers." 'o The word
"present" seems to me to indicate an intent to have previously-existing
law continue with respect to review of discretion, and this is the
interpretion the courts have given.20
The Senate Committee said: "Section 10 on judicial review does
not apply in any situation so far as . . agency action is by law
committed to agency discretion . . . . The basic exception of matters
committed to agency discretion would apply even if not stated at the
outset." 21
The House Committee said: "Section 10 on judicial review does
not apply in any situation so far as . . . agency action is by law
committed to agency discretion. . . . Where laws are so broadly
drawn that agencies have large discretion, the situation cannot be
remedied by an administrative procedure act . . . .
This, then, is some of the legislative history against Mr. Berger's
position. It seems to me rather substantial, just as the legislative
history in support of Mr. Berger's view is rather substantial.
Mr. Berger in his latest pronouncement says that the legislative
history is not conflicting.23  In his Columbia Law Review article, he
has three pages under the title "'The Legislative History" and those
three pages do not mention any single statement I have quoted from
17 S. Doc. No. 248, 79th Cong., 2d Sess. 229 (1946).
18 Id. at 84.
11 Id. at 36.
20 See DAvis, TREATISE § 28.16 (Supp. 1965), presenting the case law.
21 Id. at 212. (Emphasis in original omitted.)
22 Id. at 275. (Emphasis in original omitted.)
2 3 Berger, Rejoinder 816-17.
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the legislative history. 4 Is he unwilling to look at the history that
is against him?
For clarity, let me repeat that I do not base my position upon the
legislative history; it seems to me too conflicting and confusing. My
position is based upon an effort to find a sound solution. The legis-
lative history, because it is so conflicting, does not compel any one
interpretation. Under these circumstances, I am satisfied that, taken
as a whole, it is not inconsistent with my solution.
The Case Law
In section 28.16 of the 1965 Supplement to my Administrative
Law Treatise, I have comprehensively reviewed the case law on the
subject of reviewability of administrative discretion for arbitrariness
or abuse, and I see no reason to repeat that analysis. The analysis
covers two Supreme Court cases and a dozen other federal decisions,
all of which refuse review of administrative discretion for arbitrariness
or abuse.
Since that Supplement was published, the Supreme Court has
rendered a decision denying review to an exercise of administrative
discretion, and the Fourth Circuit2 6 and a district court2 7 have
specifically adopted my analysis.
I know of no case that supports Mr. Berger's position.
In addition, the case law on the much broader question whether
the Administrative Procedure Act changed any of the law of review-
ability is reasonably uniform. The law remains essentially the same
as the pre-act law, as chapter 28 of my Treatise and Supplement shows.
Professor Jaffe reaches essentially the same conclusion: "The Adminis-
trative Procedure Act has had a negligible effect on the basic right
to judicial review." '
24 Berger, Administrative Arbitrariness 62-65.
2
5Brotherhood of Ry. Clerks v. Association for the Benefit of Non-Contract
Employees, 380 U.S. 650 (1965). The Court reviewed to determine whether the
Mediation Board complied with the statute but refused to review the exercise of
discretion.
26 First Nat'l Bank v. Saxon, 352 F.2d 267, 270 (4th Cir. 1965).
2 Vucinic v. United States Immigration & Naturalization Serv., 243 F. Supp.
113 (D. Ore. 1965). The court quotes the combination of the introductory clause
of § 10 with a part of subsection (e) and says, as I have said: "The foregoing
quotation . . . produces an unacceptable result if read literally. By its terms, the
statute grants a court power to review an abuse of discretion except so far as the
agency may exercise discretion. The exception altogether consumes the power."
Id. at 116. The court then quotes from my Administrative Law Text and adopts my
analysis. It concludes that power to deny an alien a parole is not "committed" to
the District Director's discretion. Ibid. Both the decision and the opinion seem
to me sound.
28 JAFFE, JUDIcIAL CONTROL OF ADmiNISTRATWEF AcTIoN 372 (1965). When
Professor Jaffe says that "there are statutory discretions which are not subject to
judicial review," he takes a position directly opposed to Berger's. Id. at 359-60.
[Vol.l14:823
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Mr. Berger's principal claim of support in the case law is a
dictum in a district court case that has now been decided by the
Fourth Circuit.' The dictum does not seem to me to support him,
but in view of the Fourth Circuit's opinion along another line, that
question matters little."
Mr. Berger spends many pages trying to tear down my analysis
of cases. I have studied all he has written, and I find no reason to
change my analysis of any case. In analyzing a case, Mr. Berger
often argues against the court that has decided it. For instance, he
says: "Next there are the Cadillac and Pullman cases which .
conclude that the discretion exception cuts off review of abuse of
discretion on the ground that 'we have no right to disregard this plain
language.' But what then becomes of the equally 'plain' section 10(e)
direction to set aside abuse of discretion?" "' When he does this kind
of thing, he implicitly acknowledges that the law of the cases is against
him. And of course the specific answer to his specific question is that
section 10(e) gives no "direction to set aside abuse of discretion."
Section 10(e) gives a direction to set aside abuse of discretion except
so far as agency action is by law committed to agency discretion. Mr.
Berger repeatedly goes wrong by reading portions of section 10 with-
out taking into account the "except" clause. For instance, he says
without qualification: "The matter is governed by statute: APA
section 10(e) directs that courts 'shall . . . set aside agency action
found to be (1) arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion
... , )1"2 He says without qualification that "section 10(e) ex-
pressly instructs the courts to set aside action that is 'arbitrary' or an
'abuse of discretion.' "' In the act as written, what he quotes in
29First Nat'l Bank v. First Nat'l Bank, 232 F. Supp. 725 (E.D.N.C. 1964),
rev'd on other grounds sub iwin. First Natl Bank v. Saxon, 352 F.2d 267 (4th
Cir. 1965).
80 Mr. Berger spends three pages in his first article, Berger, Administrative Arbi-
trariness 75-78, and two pages in his third, Berger, Rejoinder 819-20, on Community
Nat'l Bank v. Gidney, 192 F. Supp. 514 (E.D. Mich. 1961). The court first held that
approval by the Comptroller of the Currency of establishment of a branch bank was
not reviewable and later changed its mind. Granting and denying licenses has tra-
ditionally been reviewable, and therefore the holding that it was not seemed worthy
of mention in the 1963 Supplement to my Treatise. It seemed wrong but unimportant,
and I cited it with no word of approval or disapproval. Mr. Berger says falsely that
I cited it "with approval." Berger, Rejoinder 819. When the court backtracked,
the case was no longer noteworthy and I did not keep it in the 1965 Supplement.
Mr. Berger implies that I have done something especially sinister in discarding this
unimportant case. He further attempts to demonstrate inconsistency on my part by
showing that what the court says is inconsistent with something I have said! He
also seems to say that the court's backtracking supports his position; if a case holding
that licensing is reviewable supports him, then any good law clerk can give him ten
thousand cases that will support him.
31 Berger, Reply 803.
32 Id. at 785.
33 Id. at 798.
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these passages is modified by the "except" clause, which he completely
ignores in such statements as the ones I have quoted.
The whole introductory clause of section 10 has two parts:
"Except so far as (1) statutes preclude judicial review or (2) agency
action is by law committed to agency discretion . . . ." Mr. Berger
tries to distinguish some of my cases by saying that they come under
the first part, not the second. 4 He apparently does not realize that
whenever a statute precludes review of discretion, agency action is by
law committed to agency discretion. That a statute precludes review
does not mean that the discretion exception is inapplicable, for the
two parts of the introductory clause overlap.
I do not know what Mr. Berger's main position about the case
law is, for he never says. 5 His main point, though not clearly
articulated, seems to be that the case law is wrong. This is apparently
what he means when he says: "If I am not properly overawed by 'the
cases' . . I only follow an example sanctified by Professor Davis
himself." 3' Then he quotes my statement that the ultimate principle
(about judicial notice) is different from what the Supreme Court has
said. He says he, too, can make an appeal to principle, to the statute,
to the legislative history and to the Constitution. I agree that he
can. But when he does, he seems to be acknowledging that the case
law is against him, even though he refuses to make that acknowledg-
ment directly and clearly.
My opinion is that the case law is (a) sound, and (b) uniform.
Constitutional Principles
Mr. Berger relies throughout his three presentations on the idea
that the Constitution requires judicial review to protect against arbi-
trariness or abuse. For instance, he says that "in my view, the right
to be protected against arbitrariness is rooted in the Constitution.
34 Berger, Reply 796-99.
35 1 am pleased with his statement near the end of his latest pronouncement that
"there is a presumption that arbitrariness is reviewable unless there is 'evidence to
the contrary' that Congress 'wished to close the door.'" Berger, Rejoinder 821.
(Emphasis in original.) This is my position, too, and has been since I first wrote
about reviewability in terms of "presumption" in 1954. I said in § 28.07 of my
Treatise: "The decisions of the past two or three decades fit reasonably well the
idea of a presumption of reviewability that may be rebutted by affirmative indication
of legislative intent in favor of unreviewability, or by some special reason for un-
reviewability growing out of the subject matter or the circumstances." 4 DAVIs,
TREATISE § 28.07, at 31. But Mr. Berger asserts that the idea of a presumption of
reviewability "is vastly to be preferred to Davis' 'intrinsically unsuited' standard."
Berger, Rejoinder 821. He misunderstands when he goes on to say: "Professor Davis
puts the shoe on the other foot: 'nothing but the clearest and strongest congressional
intent could induce the court to undertake tasks which the judges deem inappropriate
for judicial action.'" Id. at 821. He fails to note that that statement is limited to "tasks
which the judges deem inappropriate for judicial action." I still believe in a presump-
tion of reviewability and I want to strengthen it.
6 erger, Reply 795,
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• . ., And he says: "It is not merely logic but the Constitution
which is the source of the proposition that 'delegated power . . .may
not be exercised arbitrarily.' "
My opinion is that these Berger statements would be sound if
they were properly limited. Cutting off judicial review of some
administrative action in some circumstances would be unconstitutional.
One reason we have so much judicial review of discretion is that our
constitutional tradition calls for it.
But Mr. Berger's position is that all discretion must be reviewable
for arbitrariness or abuse, and that position is not at all supported by
constitutional doctrine. My position--challenged by Mr. Berger-is
that some administrative discretion is unreviewable for arbitrariness or
abuse, both under the APA and under the Constitution.
The case law is overwhelmingly in support of my position. For
instance, when an officer was buying steel for the government, the
Supreme Court in holding that the officer's determination was not
judicially reviewable did not even mention the possibility that a con-
stitutional question might be involved. 9 When in 1943 and again in
1965 the Supreme Court held administrative discretion unreviewable
with respect to determining a unit for collective bargaining, neither
the majority nor the dissenters in either case disclosed awareness of
any constitutional question.4'
The Practical Needs
My opinion is that making all administrative discretion judicially
reviewable would be impracticable and that this is the reason that
neither Congress nor the courts have done it.
Consider the young man during this Viet Nam period whose
preference is for the nonmilitary. Discretion creates an international
trouble spot. No judicial review. Discretion resorts to military power.
No review. Discretion calls up more draftees. No review. Discretion
changes a physical requirement so as to include the young man. No
review. Discretion sends his unit to the trouble spot. No review.
Discretion orders him into enemy fire. No review. Discretion, after
he is wounded, keeps him and uses him again. No review. Discretion
denies him the commission he seeks. No review. Discretion with-
holds the medal or other recognition he wants. No review. Dis-
cretion denies him money he thinks he is entitled to as a disabled
37 Berger, Administrative Arbitrariness 57-58.3 8 Berger, Reply 809.
39 Perkins v. Lukens Steel Co., 310 U.S. 113 (1940).4 0 Switchmen's Union v. National Mediation Bd., 320 U.S. 297 (1943); Brother-
hood of Ry. Clerks v. Association for the Benefit of Non-Contract Employees, 380
U.S. 650 (1965). Section 28.19 of my Treatise entitled "What Is the Constitutional
Principle Governing Unreviewability?" is devoted to the question.
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veteran. No review. Discretion refuses him admission to St.
Elizabeth's Hospital. No review. Discretion denies him burial at
Arlington. No review.
In contemplating the foregoing paragraph, let us recall that the
term "agency" in the APA includes the President, cabinet members
and other executive officers.41 It includes the military, except "courts
martial and military commissions" and "military or naval authority
exercised in the field in time of war or in occupied territory." 4 As
I understand it, the technical law is that we are not at war in Viet Nam.
Do we want the courts to review for possible abuse of discretion
all the determinations made by all officers of the army, navy and air
force in domestic military posts?
Should any court have had the authority to decide whether Presi-
dent Kennedy abused his discretion in the Bay of Pigs venture? Should
a court determine whether President Johnson is abusing his discretion
in conducting the Viet Nam war, or in refusing to recognize China?
The APA was fully applicable in 1955 when the Supreme Court held:
"The status of the Republic of China in our courts is a matter for
determination by the Executive and is outside the competence of this
Court." 4
Should a court review for abuse of discretion such administrative
action as: the President's appointment to a federal court in Massa-
chusetts of one thought by some to be unqualified; a warden's assign-
ment of a prisoner to a cell in the old and unpleasant part of the
prison; an FBI agent's choice of an old enemy for investigation when
the facts and circumstances surrounding five others who might be
investigated are the same; the President's refusal of a pardon; a
secret service agent's choice not to make an arrest that might properly
be made; a decision by the Antitrust Division of the Justice Depart-
ment to bring a proceeding against one company when half a dozen
others would also be appropriate defendants; an antipoverty worker's
decision denying use of government money to straighten a woman's
teeth; a prosecutor's refusal to make a deal for a lesser charge in return
for a plea of guilty?
The courts may be doing very well in their refusal to review some
administrative discretion.
41 Section 2(a), 60 Stat 237 (1946), 5 U.S.C. § 1001(a) (1964). Section 2(a)
defines "agency" as "each authority . . . of the Government of the United States other
than Congress, the courts, or the governments of the possessions, Territories, or
the District of Columbia."42 Ibid.
43 National City Bank v. Republic of China, 348 U.S. 356, 358 (1955). In
Ludecke v. Watkins, 335 U.S. 160, 164 (1948), the Court said: "The very nature of
the President's power to order the removal of all enemy aliens rejects the notion that
courts may pass judgment upon the exercise of his discretion."
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Other Ways To Correct Arbitrary Discretion
I am as much against the arbitrary exercise of discretion as Mr.
Berger is. Both in my Treatise and in the 1965 Supplement I have
advocated enlargement of reviewability. But because I agree with
the courts that some discretion is intrinsically unsuited to judicial
review, I think the principal hope in a fight against the arbitrary exer-
cise of discretion lies in measures other than judicial review. Vast
discretionary power seems to me inevitable, but I think we need to
cut back a great deal of unnecessary discretionary power; an out-
standing example is the great power of our city police departments to
modify or to nullify, through lack of enforcement or through selective
enforcement, the criminal law enacted by legislative bodies. Many
other officers of our federal, state and local governments have dis-
cretionary power that is broader than it should be. Even when the
discretionary power is properly broad, we can do much more than
we are doing to protect against arbitrariness. We need more rule
making-and earlier rule making-as a means of confining discretion.
When hearings are inappropriate, we need more findings of fact,
reasoned opinions and respect for precedents as a means of greater
consistency. We need more administrative checks on administrative
discretion. Above all, we need to enlist much more than we do the
natural ally of fairness and the natural enemy of arbitrariness-open-
ness. The findings, the opinions and the results of discretionary de-
cisions-even when hearings are not held-should be open to
public inspection except when a special reason requires secrecy. As
Brandeis said, sunlight is a good disinfectant. We need a greater
ingenuity in developing better systems to check, to confine and to
structure administrative discretion.
I hope Mr. Berger will direct his talents to fighting against arbi-
trariness on the front where the main hope lies.*
*EDITORs' NoTE: Mr. Berger has not been granted an opportunity to reply;
following receipt of his second piece, the editors decided and communicated to both
authors that Professor Davis' second response would conclude the debate.
